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THE GUIDING HAND OF COUNSEL, FOR A PRICE:
JUVENILE PUBLIC DEFENDER FEES AND THEIR EFFECTS
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INTRODUCTION
When he was thirteen, Jonathan, a teenager from New Hamp-
shire, was charged with simple assault after a fight with his father.1
During his hearing in juvenile court, his father refused to pay the
$275 New Hampshire public defender fee, and Jonathan—unable to
afford the price of counsel—waived his right to an attorney.2 He was
placed on probation and struggled to meet his probation require-
ments, resulting in his arrest for probation violations.3 Because the
court was deciding whether to detain Jonathan, Jonathan was
appointed a juvenile defender.4 The attorney brought Jonathan’s
unstable home life to the judge’s attention, and the judge dismissed
the case.5 While Jonathan was ultimately fortunate, his story
illustrates how public defender fees destabilize children’s6 lives and
leave them unrepresented at critical points during delinquency
proceedings.7
In 1967, the Supreme Court extended the right to counsel to
juveniles during delinquency proceedings through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, holding that a “juvenile
needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to
make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the
proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to
prepare and submit it.”8 Since then, every state has guaranteed
juveniles the right to counsel, which juveniles can usually waive if
their waiver is knowing and voluntary.9 However, states still erect






6. This Note uses the terms “juveniles,” “children,” and “youths” to refer to those who are
under age eighteen facing adjudication in the juvenile justice system.
7. See id.; see also Mary Ann Scali, Meeting of the Mandates of Gault: Automatic
Appointment of Counsel in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 70 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 7, 11-12
(2019) (discussing the importance of appointing counsel significantly before juvenile detention
hearings to ensure effective assistance of counsel).
8. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) (footnote omitted).
9. LINDA A. SZYMANSKI, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST., JUVENILE DELINQUENT’S RIGHT TO
COUNSEL AND WAIVER OF THAT RIGHT (2008 UPDATE) (Aug. 2008), http://www.ncjj.org/PDF/
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barriers to juveniles’ access to public defenders and court-appointed
counsel by imposing public defender fees.10 Some public defender
fees impose costs on the front end of juveniles’ involvement in the
juvenile court system by charging juveniles and their families a fee
or a co-pay to apply for a public defender.11 Some states, in addition
to or instead of such fees, require children and their parents to
reimburse the state or county for the total or partial cost of repre-
sentation.12 Twelve states and the District of Columbia do not
charge juveniles or their families for the cost of a public defender.13
This Note seeks to examine public defender fees from a national
viewpoint, situate them in the context of the juvenile justice system
and its history, understand their deleterious impact on juveniles
and their families, and suggest alternatives. Part I of this Note
provides background on the development of the juvenile justice
system and the juvenile right to counsel. Part II describes the
Supreme Court precedents that are key to understanding public
defender fee systems. It also discusses the different statutory
schemes states use to impose and collect public defender fees in the
juvenile system. Part III discusses the problems that public
defender fees pose from doctrinal and practical standpoints. Finally,
Part IV identifies various ways in which states could prevent public
defender fees from chilling juveniles’ right to counsel. These include
either minimizing parental influence on children’s decisions to
waive counsel or eliminating public defender fees entirely.
Snapshots/2008/vol13_no8_waiverofcounsel.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JFL-BVBJ].
10. See generally JESSICA FEIERMAN, NADIA MOZAFFAR, NAOMI GOLDSTEIN & EMILY
HANEY-CARON, JUV. L. CTR., THE PRICE OF JUSTICE (2018), https://jlc.org/sites/default/files/
attachments/2018-07/Paying-For-Justice-2018FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z833-25UQ]. Some
states and counties utilize court-appointed counsel instead of public defenders. See, e.g.,
Virginia, NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR. (July 2018), https://njdc.info/practice-policy-resources/state-
profiles/virginia/ [https://perma.cc/MJ8T-BS53]. This Note refers to the fees that states charge
children and their families as “public defender fees.”
11. FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 7; NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., supra note 1, at 22-23.
12. FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 7; NAT'L JUV. DEF. CTR., supra note 1, at 22.
13. Debtors’ Prison for Kids, JUV. L. CTR., https://debtorsprison.jlc.org/#!/map [https://
perma.cc/P4LS-XTLJ] (under the map titled “Fees Established by State Law,” click on the
dropbox menu titled “Type of Fee”; then uncheck all of the boxes except “Cost of Counsel”;
then click “x” in the top right corner of the dropbox menu).
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I. THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Understanding the development of the juvenile justice system and
juveniles’ right to counsel is key to appreciating the importance of
counsel for juveniles and the effects of public defender fees. This
Part delves into the juvenile justice system’s rehabilitative purpose
and how the right to counsel squares with this aim.
A. The Development of the Juvenile Justice System
The juvenile justice system developed during the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries as part of the Progressive Era,
beginning with the first juvenile court statute in Illinois in 1899.14
The reformers who instigated the development of the juvenile
justice system believed children were “essentially good.”15 Conse-
quently, reformers sought to do away with the concepts of guilt and
innocence within the system.16 They instead promoted rehabilitation
and treatment.17 These developments emphasized the role of the
State as the parens patriae, or a parental entity that would
intervene to care for children when their parents had presumably
failed to control them.18 However, this emphasis on “social control”
meant that children received fewer due process protections than
adults, and judges exercised extensive and arbitrary power over the
adjudication and outcome of juvenile cases.19
Today, the structure and terminology of the juvenile system
continue to reflect this primary focus on rehabilitation rather than
punishment. For example, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the Court
held juveniles do not have the right to a jury trial because the use
of juries in the juvenile system would impose the adversarial
structure of the adult system on the juvenile system’s “intimate,
14. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1967).
15. Id. at 15.
16. Id. at 15-16.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 16.
19. Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile
Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 577, 587 (2002).
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informal protective proceeding[s].”20 Additionally, juvenile delin-
quency adjudication21 is a civil—not a criminal—process.22 The
names of the stages in juvenile proceedings lack the punitive
connotations of their counterparts in the adult system. For example,
the “adjudicatory phase” refers to what would be the trial phase in
the adult system and the “disposition phase” refers to sentencing.23
B. The History and Development of the Right to Counsel for
Juveniles
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.”24 By the 1960s, the Court began to reckon
with the limited rights the juvenile justice system afforded to youth.
During this decade, the Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel for indigent defendants charged with felonies in
state court in Gideon v. Wainwright.25 Just four years later in In re
Gault, the Court unequivocally rejected the notion of the State as
parens patriae and held that juveniles were entitled to counsel.26
In In re Gault, fifteen-year-old Gerard Gault had been adjudi-
cated delinquent and sentenced to custody until age twenty-one
after making lewd phone calls to a neighbor.27 No one notified
Gault’s parents that he had been arrested.28 His parents did not see
the petition for Gault’s arrest until a habeas hearing two months
20. 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
21. An adjudication of delinquency is similar to a criminal conviction. Juvenile Court
Terminology, NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., https://njdc.info/juvenile-court-terminology/ [https://
perma.cc/HU25-PRWG]. Such an adjudication occurs when a juvenile court judge finds
whether a juvenile has committed the delinquent act with which she is charged. Id.
22. Marsha Levick & Neha Desai, Still Waiting: The Elusive Quest to Ensure Juveniles
a Constitutional Right to Counsel at All Stages of the Juvenile Court Process, 60 RUTGERS L.
REV. 175, 184 (2007).
23. Id. at 180.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
25. 372 U.S. 335, 339-40, 342 (1963). The Court later expanded the right to counsel to all
criminal defendants at risk of imprisonment, regardless of the kind of offense with which they
were charged. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
26. 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967); Berkheiser, supra note 19, at 595-96.
27. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 4.
28. Id. at 5.
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after it occurred.29 The day after his arrest, Gault was adjudicated
delinquent and sentenced to custody in an informal, unrecorded
hearing, during which the judge questioned him without an
attorney.30 His parents then filed a habeas writ, which the Superior
Court of Arizona dismissed.31 The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed
the dismissal of the writ.32
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed this decision.33 In In re Gault,
the Court extended the right to counsel to juveniles through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.34 Specifically, the
Court held that in any proceeding in which a child may be sentenced
to custody in an institution, counsel should appear on behalf of the
child and his parents.35 Further, if the child’s parents cannot afford
to pay for an attorney, the Court instructed that courts should
appoint one.36 The Court highlighted that had Gault been an adult,
he would have been “entitled to clear advice that he could be
represented by counsel, and ... if a felony were involved, the State
would be required to provide counsel if his parents were unable to
afford it.”37 Further, the Court spelled out in detail why, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, juveniles are entitled to counsel:
“[J]uvenile[s] need[ ] the assistance of counsel to cope with problems
of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regular-
ity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense
and ... submit it.”38 In the decades after In re Gault, every state
codified juveniles’ right to counsel.39
C. Juveniles and Waiver of the Right to Counsel
The In re Gault Court extended the right to counsel to juveniles
but did not squarely address the issue of juvenile waiver of the right
29. Id.
30. Id. at 5-6.
31. Id. at 8-9.
32. Id. at 10.
33. Id. at 41, 58.
34. Id. at 41.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 29.
38. Id. at 36 (footnote omitted).
39. SZYMANSKI, supra note 9.
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to counsel.40 Rather, the Court held that Gault’s mother did not
waive her or her son’s right to counsel when she appeared without
counsel at the delinquency hearing despite knowing that counsel
could have represented her and Gault at that hearing.41
In the adult criminal justice system, the Supreme Court defines
a waiver as “ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandon-
ment of a known right or privilege.”42 The Supreme Court views
criminal defendants’ waivers of their constitutional rights skepti-
cally.43 The Court encourages lower courts to “indulge every rea-
sonable presumption against” the waiver of these rights.44
The Court has not definitively held whether juveniles can waive
the right to counsel during formal proceedings, but it has addressed
juvenile waiver in other contexts. Twelve years after In re Gault, the
Court held that a juvenile may waive his right to counsel at a
custodial police interrogation if he does so “knowingly and intelli-
gently” in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation.45 The Court highlighted “the juvenile’s age, experi-
ence, education, background, and intelligence, and ... [his] capacity
to understand the warnings [regarding his rights to remain silent
and have counsel present during an interrogation] given him, the
nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of
waiving those rights” as pertinent factors in the totality-of-the-
circumstances test.46
Since the development of the juvenile right to counsel, states have
taken a variety of statutory approaches to juvenile waiver in formal
proceedings. Only Illinois has completely banned juvenile waiver of
counsel.47 Some states prohibit waiver when “conditions related to
age, type of offense, competency, and the possibility of confinement”
warrant the appointment of nonwaivable counsel.48 Other states
are more lenient and permit waiver when a court finds that the
40. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41.
41. See id. at 41-42.
42. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1937).
43. See id.
44. Id. (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937)).
45. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725-26 (1979).
46. Id. at 725.
47. NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., supra note 1, at 27 n.83.
48. Id. at 27.
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juvenile has knowingly and voluntarily waived this right.49 Forty-
three states permit juveniles to waive their right to an attorney
without first consulting a lawyer about their decision.50 Eight states
require children to consult with an attorney before waiving their
right to counsel in all cases.51 Others require consultation only
under specific circumstances.52
In the interrogation context, the Fare Court stressed that the
totality-of-the-circumstances test for waiver protects juveniles from
coercion and provides the police and lower courts with flexibility in
dealing with older juveniles who have experience in the system and
may understand their rights better than younger children.53
Research has revealed that the flexibility surrounding the waiver
standard for juveniles has translated into a “culture of waiver”
within some juvenile courts during formal delinquency proceed-
ings.54
In certain juvenile courts, waiver is the norm rather than the
exception. The rate of waiver varies by county in some states. For
example, in Arizona, juveniles are guaranteed the right to counsel
at every stage of delinquency proceedings.55 Juvenile judges
reported that in some counties, children were not allowed to waive
counsel and all children were represented.56 In others, less than 25
percent of children had counsel during probation revocation
hearings, and “almost no children were represented by counsel at
the detention or advisory hearing.”57 In other states, waiver of
counsel is a universal problem. In Colorado, stakeholders in the
49. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 62D.030(4)(b) (2019).
50. NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., supra note 1, at 7.
51. Id. at 26.
52. Id. at 26-27.
53. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979).
54. Berkheiser, supra note 19, at 601. But see MARY ANN SCALI, JI SEON SONG WITH
PATRICIA PURITZ, NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., SOUTH CAROLINA: JUVENILE INDIGENT DEFENSE 48
(2010), https://njdc.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Final-South-Carolina-Assessment-Report.
pdf [https://perma.cc/ACU4-SGJG] (reporting that no child is allowed to waive counsel in a
delinquency hearing in South Carolina).
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juvenile system reported that 75-90 percent of children waived their
right to counsel across the state.58
A study of almost one hundred cases involving juvenile waiver of
the right to counsel during official proceedings found that juvenile
judges had not “conducted a thorough inquiry into the circum-
stances to determine whether the juvenile’s waiver was knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent, and few courts acknowledged that they
were bound by a legal standard.”59 The appellate courts upheld a
juvenile’s decision to waive counsel in nineteen cases.60 These courts
approved trial courts’ acceptance of waivers from children as young
as nine and affirmed cases in which lower courts overlooked
children’s “age, intellectual ability, educational level, emotional or
mental problems, and prior experience with the court system” when
allowing children to waive their right to counsel.61
Thus, since the 1960s, states have provided juveniles with at least
nominal access to counsel—though reality tells a different story in
certain jurisdictions. The next Part explains how states fund their
indigent defense systems and describes the Supreme Court
precedent delineating the constitutional limits on these systems.
II. CHARGING FOR “FREE” REPRESENTATION: AN OVERVIEW OF
PUBLIC DEFENDER FEE LAWS AND RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL
PRECEDENTS
Children and their families can be charged for the cost of court-
appointed counsel and public defenders in thirty-eight states.62
States use two methods to collect these costs: contribution and
recoupment.63 First, contribution constitutes an up-front, “fixed
58. PATRICIA PURITZ, NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., COLORADO: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO
COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 40
(2012),https://njdc.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Colorado_Assessment.pdf [https://perma.
cc/HZL6-7JSN].
59. Berkheiser, supra note 19, at 611.
60. Id. at 615.
61. Id. at 613.
62. See Debtors’ Prison for Kids, supra note 13.
63. Helen A. Anderson, Penalizing Poverty: Making Criminal Defendants Pay for Their
Court-Appointed Counsel Through Recoupment and Contribution, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
323, 327-40 (2009) (providing an overview of contribution and recoupment and discussing the
constitutional limitations on both).
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sum” payment.64 It is sometimes “referred to as ‘application fees,’
‘co-pays,’ ‘user fees,’ ‘administrative fees,’ or ‘registration fees.’”65 As
of 2018, ten states imposed contribution fees in juvenile cases, using
methods such as a fee charged for filing an indigency determination
application, which can range from ten dollars to fifty dollars, user
fees, which range from ten dollars to four hundred dollars, and other
administrative fees.66 These fees can sometimes be waived upon a
finding that children and their families lack the financial resources
to pay.67
Second, recoupment statutes require juveniles and their families
to partially or fully reimburse the government if the juvenile or her
family is deemed eligible for counsel but able to contribute to the
cost of representation.68 A 2018 report found that thirty states
require reimbursement whenever counsel is appointed; four states
require reimbursement only when parents who are able to pay do
not provide their child with counsel; and three states require
reimbursement when juveniles do not win their case.69
States vary in the methods they use for determining when
children are eligible for counsel. In a few states, children are
presumed indigent and are automatically entitled to an attorney,
regardless of their or their families’ financial resources.70 This
presumption does not always guarantee no-cost counsel, however.
Some states will still seek recoupment of the cost of counsel after
representation has ended. For example, in Pennsylvania, the
64. Id. at 333.
65. Id.
66. FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 8.
67. See, e.g., TENN. CODE. ANN. § 37-1-126(c)(2) (2019).
68. FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 9.
69. Id.; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-109 (2019) (requiring the court to collect full or partial
reimbursement from parents); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-706(2)(b)(I)-(II) (2019) (requiring
nonindigent parents, guardians, or legal custodians to reimburse the court for the cost of
representation unless the court waives the reimbursement requirement for good cause, or if
a conflict of interest exists between the juveniles and their parent, guardian, or legal
custodian, requiring the juvenile to reimburse the court when financially able); CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 51-296(a)-(b), -298(b) (2019) (authorizing courts to charge juveniles “for the
reasonable value of services rendered to” them if they become capable of paying the fees
“within ten years from the last date on which any services were rendered”); W.VA. CODE § 29-
21-16(g) (2019) (permitting courts to require parents or custodians to pay the cost of counsel
if they are able to without undue hardship and the juvenile is adjudicated delinquent).
70. A 2017 report found a total of eleven states presume indigence. NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR.,
supra note 1, at 10 n.17.
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presumption of indigence can “be rebutted if the court ascertains
that the child has the financial resources to retain counsel of his
choice at his own expense.”71 Other states also charge contribution
costs despite the indigence presumption. In Delaware, anyone under
eighteen “arrested or charged with a crime or act of delinquency
shall be automatically eligible for representation by the Office of
Defense Services.”72 But juveniles in that state may be charged a
one hundred dollar administrative fee when a public defender ap-
pears on their behalf.73
Most states do not presume juveniles to be indigent.74 These
states instead require a pre-appointment assessment of the child’s
or the parents’ finances to determine eligibility for appointed
counsel on a case-by-case basis.75 In these jurisdictions, juveniles or
their parents must provide their financial information to the public
defender, the court, or another public agency.76 The public defender,
court, or agency then determines whether the juveniles or their
parents have the ability to pay for an attorney.77 If a parent refuses
to hire an attorney, or if there is a conflict of interest between the
parent and child, the state may require courts to appoint one.78
Then, the state or county will recoup the full or partial cost of
representation from the parent or child.79 Courts and public
defender offices usually deem juveniles whose family income falls at
or below 125 percent of the federal poverty line to be indigent and
eligible for a public defender or appointed counsel.80
71. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6337.1(b)(1) (2019).
72. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4602(c) (2020).
73. Id. § 4607(a). The Delaware statute explicitly provides that failure to pay the one
hundred dollars will not result in the revocation of appointed counsel. Id. § 4607(c).
74. NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., supra note 1, at 6.
75. Juvenile Defense: Indigency Requirements 2013, JUV.JUST.:GEOGRAPHY,POL’Y,PRAC.
& STAT., http://www.jjgps.org/juvenile-defense#indigency-requirements [https://perma.cc/
KF9W-SQM5]. States may carve out exceptions to this case-by-case approach. For example,
Virginia presumes children facing immediate custody to be eligible for counsel if they do not
have counsel already. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266(B) (2020).
76. See NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., supra note 1, at 11.
77. Id.
78. FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 6.
79. Id.
80. NAT'L JUV. DEF. CTR., supra note 1, at 11. The 2019 federal poverty guidelines for the
forty-eight contiguous states and D.C. indicated that, for a family of four, the poverty
guideline is $25,750. 2019 Poverty Guidelines, OFF. OF THE ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR PLAN. &
EVALUATION, https://aspe.hhs.gov/2019-poverty-guidelines [https://perma.cc/L7SA-XDBN].
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The Supreme Court has not yet evaluated the constitutionality of
these contribution and recoupment schemes in the juvenile setting.
However, in a series of precedents from the 1970s, the Court
considered various adult public defender fee statutes in light of the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
First, in James v. Strange, the Court held that a Kansas recoup-
ment statute violated the Equal Protection Clause.81 The statute in
that case required indigent defendants to reimburse the state for
the cost of representation within sixty days, or a judgment for the
cost would be filed against them.82 The judgment would become a
lien on their property and could be collected by garnishment or
other methods allowed under the state’s code of civil procedure.83 In
contrast, criminal defendants were not entitled to the same
protections that the code of civil procedure provided to civil
debtors.84 Consequently, the statute’s “elements of punitiveness and
discrimination” violated the Equal Protection Clause, and the Court
struck it down.85
Second, Fuller v. Oregon involved a challenge to Oregon’s
recoupment statute, which required convicted defendants to repay
the cost of their representation by court-appointed counsel if the
cost did not “impose manifest hardship on the defendant or his
immediate family.”86 The Court held that the recoupment law did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it afforded the same
protections to criminal and civil debtors.87 Further, the delineation
between defendants who had been convicted and those who had not
or those whose convictions were overturned on appeal was “non-
invidious.”88 Additionally, the Court found that the recoupment law
did not substantially “chill” the defendants’ Sixth Amendment right
to counsel.89 The Court held that an indigent defendant’s knowledge
that he might have to repay the cost of counsel when he could do so
81. 407 U.S. 128, 141-42 (1972).
82. Id. at 129.
83. Id. at 131.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 141-42.
86. 417 U.S. 40, 45-46 (1974) (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 161.665(4) (1973)).
87. Id. at 47-48.
88. Id. at 49.
89. Id. at 51-52.
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would not deter him from accepting court-appointed counsel.90 The
legislature had “designed [the law] to insure that only those who
actually become capable of repaying the State will ever be obliged
to do so.”91 The relationship between these precedents and public
defender fee statutes in the juvenile system is discussed in Part
III.A.
III. PROBLEMS POSED BY JUVENILE PUBLIC DEFENDER FEE
STATUTES
Understanding public defender fees in the context of the juvenile
justice system is necessary to comprehend their chilling effects and
how they starkly contradict the system’s original rehabilitative
goals. Public defender fee statutes engender serious negative
consequences for youth and lack adequate due process protections
for both children and their families. These laws chill juveniles’ right
to counsel.
A. Public Defender Fees Reinforce the Shift from Rehabilitation to
Punishment in Juvenile Justice
When assessing the constitutionality of recoupment schemes, the
Court has inquired into whether a law has the purpose or effect of
penalizing individuals seeking to exercise their right to counsel92
and struck down laws that demonstrate “elements of punitive-
ness.”93 Any “elements of punitiveness” in the purpose or effects of
juvenile public defender fee laws should be viewed skeptically and
minimized.94 Although the Court rejected the notion of the State as
parens patriae and expanded juveniles’ rights in In re Gault, the
Court has long sought to preserve the juvenile justice system’s focus
on rehabilitation.95 For example, in McKeiver, the Court declined to
extend the right to a jury trial to juveniles on the grounds that the
90. Id. at 53.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 54.
93. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 142 (1972).
94. See id. at 141-42.
95. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-20 (1967).
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juvenile system is meant to be an “informal protective proceeding,”96
in which any resulting “[s]upervision or confinement is aimed at
rehabilitation, not at convincing the juvenile of his error simply by
imposing pains and penalties.”97
Yet, over time, the juvenile justice system has become increas-
ingly punitive rather than rehabilitative. Although many states
maintain that the system’s purpose is to protect the best interests
of court-involved youth, in practice, states have instead advanced
the competing goals of public safety and punishment.98 For example,
during the 1990s, concern about violent youth offenders grew.99
Consequently, states passed laws providing courts with increased
discretion to transfer juveniles to the adult system or requiring
automatic transfer in some cases.100
Additionally, youths and their families must pay a growing
number of fees and fines outside of public defender fees.101 These
other costs include fees for probation and supervision, diversion
programs, health evaluations, the cost of care, as well as record ex-
pungement and sealing.102 Families are also responsible for court
costs, fines, and restitution.103 Failure to pay these charges could
result in extended incarceration, a civil or criminal contempt
charge, or a probation violation for youths.104 When parents do
not pay the fees for which they are liable, they may also be held
in civil or criminal contempt.105
Juvenile public defender fees reinforce this underlying shift in
focus from rehabilitation to punishment. In some jurisdictions,
failure to reimburse the state for the costs of counsel could be
96. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
97. Id. at 552 (White, J., concurring).
98. See Linda F. Giardino, Note, Statutory Rhetoric: The Reality Behind Juvenile Justice
Policies in America, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 223, 275-76 (1996).
99. Id. at 257-58.
100. See id. at 258-74 (discussing laws passed in Michigan, Massachusetts, California, New
Jersey, and New York designed to punish rather than rehabilitate violent juvenile offenders).
101. JESSICA FEIERMAN WITH NAOMI GOLDSTEIN, EMILY HANEY-CARON & JAMES FAIRFAX
COLUMBO, JUV. L. CTR., DEBTORS’ PRISON FOR KIDS? 3 (2016), https://debtorsprison.jlc.org/
documents/JLC-Debtors-Prison.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZX9-F9PV].
102. Id. at 10-16, 20-21.
103. Id. at 17-18, 21-22.
104. Id. at 23.
105. Id.
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assessed against the youth themselves,106 or result in an order
against the parents or other individuals responsible for the
juvenile.107 In others, nonpayment of counsel costs may result in a
civil judgment against the parent.108
Notably, in Oregon, the punitive nature of the public defender
fees law manifests more clearly. When determining whether to
order youths to pay for the cost of determining their eligibility for
appointed counsel, the statute allows a court both to “consider the
reformative effect of having the youth pay” and to “order that a
portion of any moneys earned by the youth in juvenile work projects
be used to pay costs” of counsel.109 This statute explicitly links the
state’s chosen method of cost collection to the sanctions that a court
has imposed on a juvenile.110
Even in states in which the legislature has not explicitly charac-
terized public defender fees as a sanction, these fees still contribute
to the trend toward punitiveness within the juvenile justice system.
For instance, the indigency application process “can be fraught with
delays,” leaving a child without counsel for an extended period of
time.111 This process also raises the possibilities that children will
remain in detention or their cases will stay open for longer than
necessary.112
Moreover, public defender fees may lead parents to pressure their
children to waive their right to counsel.113 Without counsel, children
are placed in a precarious position. Proceedings in juvenile court are
much less formal, and judges have great discretion in their decision-
106. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2306 (2019).
107. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 20-514(7)-(8) (2020) (permitting the prosecuting attorney of
each county to recover payment or reimbursement from the person or estate liable for the
juvenile’s counsel costs within five years of the appointment of counsel); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 31.125, 610.060(4) (West 2020) (permitting the court to order parents to pay for their child’s
representation if found able to pay).
108. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-109 (2020); ALA. R. JUV. P. 31(B).
109. OR. REV. STAT. § 419C.203(4) (2019).
110. See id.
111. Kenneth J. King, Patricia Puritz & David A. Shapiro, The Importance of Early
Appointment of Counsel in Juvenile Court, in TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 13, 14-15 (Carol R.
Flango et al. eds., 2014), https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/ctadmin/id/2078
[https:// perma.cc/EE7E-K4FB].
112. Id. at 15.
113. See infra Part III.C.4.
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making.114 Consequently, “aggressive and well-organized”115 juvenile
public defenders play a crucial role in protecting juveniles’ due
process rights.116 Their role is all the more important because of the
enduring harmful effects of an adjudication of delinquency. State
and federal sentencing guidelines permit courts to enhance adult
sentences if an offender has a juvenile record.117 Additionally,
youths with prior juvenile adjudications can be transferred to adult
court if they are charged with any crime in the future.118 A juvenile
record can limit youths’ ability to join the military, go to college,
and apply for jobs.119 For immigrant youth, transferal to the adult
system can lead to deportation.120 By reducing children’s access to
an attorney through delays and causing waivers of counsel grounded
in fear and family pressures, public defender fees undermine the
juvenile system’s rehabilitative purpose.
B. Juvenile Public Defender Fees Lack Procedural Due Process
Protections
Juvenile recoupment laws sometimes lack important due process
protections, indicating that they “go[ ] beyond legitimate cost re-
covery and penalize[ ] a fundamental right.”121 In the adult crimi-
nal justice system, some jurisdictions have treated public defender
fees like other criminal fines.122 These states categorize public
defender fees as punishment rather than as a form of revenue
collection and impose them regardless of an individual’s ability to
pay.123 Other jurisdictions have implemented stronger due process
protections.124 These states impose public defender fees on only
those who are capable of paying and require adequate notice and a
114. Aaron Kupchik & Angela Harvey, Court Context and Discrimination: Exploring Biases
Across Juvenile and Criminal Courts, 50 SOC. PERSPS. 417, 435-36 (2008).
115. Id. at 431.
116. Id. at 435-36.
117. See Berkheiser, supra note 19, at 646-47.
118. Id. at 647.
119. Id. at 648-49.
120. Id. at 649.
121. Anderson, supra note 63, at 326.
122. Id. at 340.
123. See id. at 340-47.
124. See id. at 339.
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meaningful opportunity to contest the imposition of these fees.125
Given the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile justice system,
public defender fees should provide for stringent due process
protections to best protect children from waiving their right to
counsel because of their or their parents’ inability to pay. Such
safeguards would ensure that fee statutes serve only economic—
not punitive—purposes.
Scholars have argued that, in the adult system, several safe-
guards should be implemented to ensure that public defender fees
are not arbitrarily imposed in violation of defendants’ due process
rights.126 In Fuller, the Court upheld the recoupment statute at
issue because it provided for a “pre-imposition determination of
ability to pay, notice [of the possibility of recoupment], and the op-
portunity to be heard.”127 Likewise, by reviewing Supreme Court
precedent on the constitutionality of fines and fees, one scholar has
identified nine such procedural due process factors:
(1) timely and adequate notice of the obligation; (2) an opportu-
nity to appear personally before the decision maker; (3) an
opportunity to present evidence; (4) an opportunity to cross-
examine; (5) representation by counsel; (6) a decision based upon
the evidence presented in accordance with the law; (7) an im-
partial decision maker; (8) a reasoned decision reflecting the
record; and (9) appellate review.128
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has held that for a recoupment pro-
gram to be constitutional, it must provide a defendant with “notice
of the contemplated action and a meaningful opportunity to be
heard,” among other requirements.129
Juvenile public defender fee statutes do not always furnish these
due process protections. For instance, Florida does not provide for
a pre-imposition determination of the ability to pay and instead
automatically creates a lien on the property of parents whose child
125. See Alexander v. Johnson, 742 F.2d 117, 124 (4th Cir. 1984); see also Anderson, supra
note 63, at 339.
126. See Anderson, supra note 63, at 364; David A. Leen, Fuller v. Oregon: The Cost of a
Constitutional Right, 55 OR. L. REV. 99, 112 (1976).
127. Anderson, supra note 63, at 367.
128. Leen, supra note 126, at 111-12 (footnotes omitted).
129. Alexander, 742 F.2d at 124.
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is adjudicated delinquent.130 The statute provides that the parent
should receive “adequate notice” of the lien and an “opportunity to
be heard and offer objection to the determination, and to be rep-
resented by counsel.”131 However, the statute requires a lien to be
placed on the property of all parents whose children relied on a
public defender—not just those with the ability to pay.132 This
statute requires parents to affirmatively contest recoupment but
provides no clear standard to demonstrate their inability to pay,
thereby harming indigent parents who may lack the resources to
petition the court for relief.133
Florida is an outlier in this regard, as juvenile public defender
fee laws usually require a calculation of a parent or child’s ability
to pay prior to the imposition of recoupment.134 Nevertheless, these
statutes may not include provisions requiring a hearing on the
ability to pay prior to the imposition of obligations.135 Relevant ju-
venile court rules may not provide for such a hearing, either.136 For
example, Idaho permits courts to impose recoupment on anyone
liable for the support of a juvenile—even if they are indigent—
unless such a payment “would impose a manifest hardship on”
them.137 Arizona similarly authorizes courts to collect full or partial
reimbursement from indigent and partially indigent juveniles or
their parents if such a payment would not cause the family “sub-
stantial hardship.”138 Neither these states’ public defender fee
statutes nor their juvenile court rules provide parents or guardians
with a procedural mechanism, such as a hearing prior to the im-
position of the obligation, for demonstrating manifest hardship
besides the initial indigency determination.139
Similarly, Washington provides for an up-front determination
of juveniles’ and their families’ ability to pay but no hearing
130. See FLA. STAT. § 938.29(1)(a), (2)(a)(2) (2019).
131. Id. § 938.29(5).
132. See id. § 938.29(2)(a)(2).
133. See id.
134. FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 6.
135. But see IOWA CODE § 232.11(3)(a), (3)(c), (5) (2020).
136. See, e.g., IDAHO JUV. R. 9(b), (d).
137. IDAHO CODE § 20-514(7) (2020).
138. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-221(G) (2020).
139. See ARIZ. JUV. CT. R. P. 10(B); IDAHO JUV. R. 9(b), (d).
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before recoupment is collected.140 The Washington public defender
fee statute requires juveniles, if found indigent but able to contrib-
ute, to execute a promissory note when counsel is appointed for
them.141 However, the determination of indigency occurs during the
juvenile’s “initial contact with the court or at the earliest time
circumstances permit,” and the statute does not provide a mecha-
nism for updating the juvenile’s financial status.142 Consequently,
it appears that if juveniles are taken into custody and they or their
family lose their income, they may have no opportunity to demon-
strate that they are no longer able to pay.143
In the adult system, some state courts have found that a hearing
prior to the entry of a judgment to collect recoupment costs would
be unnecessary, instead finding that a hearing should be required
only after the judgment is executed.144 Nevertheless “[t]hese courts
seem to conflate the due process required to enforce a judgment
with the due process required to enter a judgment.”145 In fact, Fuller
suggests that states should impose the obligation of repayment on
only those who have the “foreseeable ability” to repay it.146 Simply
put, due process requirements apply not just during the enforce-
ment of a judgment but also before its imposition.147 Such robust
protection ensures that fees are imposed on only those with the
ability to pay.148
Concededly, statutes that impose liability for the payment of
public defender fees on parents at least facially do not seem to
punish children. But empirical research has shown that the
difficulties of paying the cost of counsel “often keep a child under
supervision until they’re paid ... even if all other court sanctions
have been satisfied.”149 Thus, in reality, even public defender fee
obligations imposed solely on parents have the effect of indirectly
140. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.101.020; 13.40.140(2) (2019).
141. Id. § 10.101.020(5).
142. See id. § 10.101.020(3).
143. See id. § 10.101.020(5).
144. Anderson, supra note 63, at 348-49.
145. Id. at 349.
146. Id. at 338 (quoting Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 54 (1974)).
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 10; see also supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
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punishing court-involved children for their parents’ inability or
unwillingness to fulfill their financial duties.150
Moreover, inadequate due process protections in recoupment
programs that seek payment from only parents or guardians also
indirectly penalize children for exercising their right to counsel.
Without adequate procedural protections, public defender fee
programs chill adults’ right to counsel by imposing “the threat of an
impossible debt.”151 Likewise, when parents cannot pay the cost of
counsel and have no opportunity to contest the imposition of re-
coupment, children may waive their right to counsel due to the
financial pressure on their families.152 Part III.C elaborates on the
chilling effects of public defender fee laws and how they pose unique
harms to children.
C. Public Defender Fees Unduly Pressure Children to Waive Their
Right to Counsel
Juveniles occupy a unique place within the justice system because
the law has recognized that juveniles are not as cognitively and
emotionally developed as adults.153 In Fuller, the Court held that
recoupment statutes in the adult criminal justice system with
appropriate due process protections do not unconstitutionally chill
the right to counsel.154 However, juveniles’ relative immaturity and
fear of authority exacerbate the chilling effect of public defender
fees.
1. Children Receive Special Treatment in Supreme Court
Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court has consistently treated children and adults
differently in its jurisprudence.155 The In re Gault Court recognized
that courts must take special care to protect juveniles from making
150. See FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 10.
151. Anderson, supra note 63, at 360.
152. Cf. id. (describing the chilling effects in adult indigent defendants).
153. See Levick & Desai, supra note 22, at 200.
154. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 54 (1974).
155. See Levick & Desai, supra note 22, at 200-03.
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self-incriminating admissions.156 That is, when a juvenile makes a
self-incriminating admission to the police without counsel present,
juvenile courts should not just inquire into whether the confession
was “coerced or suggested, but also that [the confession] was not the
product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or
despair.”157 The Court has also reasoned that the law cannot treat
children “as miniature adults.”158
The issues of childhood immaturity and irrationality have
consistently appeared in cases involving police interrogations of
juveniles and juveniles’ waiver of their rights against self-incrimina-
tion and to counsel.159 Even before In re Gault, the Court recognized
in Haley v. Ohio that juveniles are not as mature as adults, holding
that the teenage years are “a tender and difficult age” due to the
“great instability which the crisis of adolescence produces.”160 These
traits, the Court held, render juveniles more susceptible to police
coercion and thus more vulnerable to involuntary confessions than
their adult counterparts.161 Additionally, in Moore v. Michigan, the
Court suggested that an individual’s age and level of education are
factors in the totality of the circumstances when determining if an
individual knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel
before pleading guilty.162
The Court echoed this reasoning in Fare, in which the Court held
that the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis for waivers of the
right to counsel during police interrogation must include an
appraisal of a child’s age, experience, and education to account for
children’s “limited experience[,] education[,] and ... immature
judgment.”163 Recently, in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Court drew
on “commonsense conclusions about behavior and perception” to
156. 387 U.S. 1, 54, 56 (1967).
157. Id. at 55.
158. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 274 (2011).
159. See Levick & Desai, supra note 22, at 201.
160. 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948).
161. Id. at 599-600.
162. 355 U.S. 155, 164-65 (1957).
163. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979). Miranda requires law enforcement to
inform criminal suspects who are in custody and subject to interrogation that they have the
right to remain silent, that anything they say will be used against them, that they have the
right to an attorney, and that if they cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed to them.
Miranda v. Arizona, 386 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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conclude that if an officer knew or should have known a child’s age
during police questioning, then that factor must be considered when
determining if the child was in custody and should have received the
Miranda warning.164
The Court has also considered juvenile cognitive development and
emotional maturity in contexts outside of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. In Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that, under the
Eighth Amendment, the death penalty does not apply to individuals
who committed capital crimes when they were younger than
eighteen.165 The Court reasoned that the death penalty is a dispro-
portionate punishment for children for three reasons. First,
juveniles are immature and irresponsible as compared to adults.166
They make irrational and impulsive decisions.167 Consequently, they
are less likely than adults to consider the costs—including the
possibility of execution—of criminal behavior, which decreases the
deterrent effect of the death penalty.168 Second, “juveniles are more
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside
pressures, including peer pressure,” than adults.169 Third, juveniles’
personalities and character traits are more fluid and amenable to
rehabilitation than those of adults.170 Juveniles do not understand
the nature and consequences of their crimes to the extent adults do
and, therefore, are not as blameworthy as adult offenders.171
Similarly, in Graham v. Florida, the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment forbids the imposition of a life sentence without the
possibility of parole on juveniles for nonhomicide crimes.172 The
Court noted that life without parole, like the death penalty, does
not serve the goals of deterrence or retribution because of juve-
niles’ relative immaturity and irrationality.173 These decisions
164. 564 U.S. 261, 272 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 674 (2004)
(Breyer, J., dissenting)).
165. 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005).
166. Id. at 569.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 571-72.
169. Id. at 569 (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).
170. Id. at 570.
171. See id.
172. 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
173. Id. at 71-72.
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demonstrate the Court’s recognition that juveniles are unique and
merit special treatment within the justice system.
2. Social Science on Juvenile Development and the Justice
System Demonstrates Children’s Immaturity
The Court’s “commonsense” assumptions about the relationship
between juveniles’ immaturity and irrationality and their Fifth,
Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights are borne out by social science
research.174 Children and adolescents are particularly susceptible to
peer influence; they strive for conformity, underestimate the
riskiness of their behavior, and focus most heavily on the short-term
(rather than the long-term) consequences of their decisions.175
Moreover, children are socialized to obey authority figures, includ-
ing their parents and officials.176 Although children may understand
that they have rights within the criminal justice system, they often
are unable to articulate exactly which rights they possess, and they
believe they lack power to assert them.177
Social science suggests that in the police interrogation context,
younger juveniles do not understand their Miranda rights or the
consequences of waiving them.178 For example, one study found that
about one-third of juveniles believed either that attorneys adjudi-
cated their clients’ cases or that attorneys were required to report
174. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 272 (2011).
175. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 160-64 (1997). 
176. See Gerald P. Koocher, Different Lenses: Psycho-Legal Perspectives on Children’s
Rights, 16 NOVA L. REV. 711, 715 (1992); cf. Barry Feld, Competence and Culpability:
Delinquents in Juvenile Courts, Youths in Criminal Courts, 102 MINN. L. REV. 473, 510-11
(2017) (noting that juveniles are more willing to waive the right to silence in police
interrogations because “they believe they should obey authority”).
177. See Christine Goodwin-De Faria & Voula Marinos, Youth Understanding & Assertion
of Legal Rights: Examining the Roles of Age and Power, 20 INT’L J. CHILD.’S RTS. 343, 350-56
(2012).
178. See Barry C. Feld, Real Interrogation: What Actually Happens When Cops Question
Kids, 47 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1, 8, 12, 18 (2013) (observing that in a sample of 307 juvenile cases,
92.8 percent of youths waived their Miranda rights—a rate 10 percent higher than the rate
at which adults waive); Jessica Owen-Kostelnik, N. Dickon Reppucci & Jessica R. Meyer,
Testimony and Interrogation of Minors: Assumptions About Maturity and Morality, 61 AM.
PSYCH. 286, 293 (2006) (summarizing social science research on juveniles’ comprehension of
their Miranda rights and waiver).
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their clients’ wrongdoing to the court.179 In comparison, only 6
percent of adults held these beliefs.180 Juveniles also were about
three times more likely than adults to believe a court could punish
them for invoking their right to remain silent.181 Juveniles younger
than fifteen were significantly less likely than adults to understand
the meaning or the function of their Miranda rights.182 These
findings indicate that younger juveniles cannot knowingly and
voluntarily waive their Miranda rights.183 Further, although older
adolescents (fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds) understood their rights
as well as young adults with comparable IQ scores, they could still
lack the emotional intelligence and maturity to validly waive their
rights.184 Altogether, these observations suggest that children may
not understand the importance of their right to counsel during
formal proceedings and may be vulnerable to waiving it in response
to financial or familial pressure.
3. States Have Enacted Additional Safeguards to Protect the
Rights of Children
States have also recognized that juveniles are prone to impru-
dent decision-making and have responded by enacting laws gov-
erning juveniles’ waiver of their Miranda rights and their right to
counsel during formal proceedings. About twelve states require a
parent or other “interested adult” to be present during a child’s
police interrogation for the child to validly waive their Miranda
179. Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis,
68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134, 1158 & n.91 (1980).
180. Id. at 1158.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1143-46, 1159-60 (explaining the methodology and results of the study).
183. Id. at 1166. Older adolescents in the study also demonstrated significant gaps in their
understanding of their Fifth Amendment rights. Older adolescents with an IQ score below
eighty demonstrated poor understanding of the Miranda warnings when compared to an
absolute standard for adequate comprehension and when compared to the adult subjects. Id.
at 1160. One-third to one-half of older adolescents with an IQ score above eighty
demonstrated an inadequate understanding of their Miranda rights using an absolute
criterion. Id. That is, they displayed an “inadequate understanding of the wording or the
significance of any Miranda statement,” but their understanding was no worse than their
adult counterparts. See id. at 1151, 1160.
184. See id. at 1157, 1165-66.
1024 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:999
rights.185 Other states presume that juveniles younger than either
fourteen or sixteen are always incompetent to waive their Miranda
rights and therefore require parental presence during interroga-
tions of all juveniles in that age range.186 In these states, there is
also a rebuttable presumption that juveniles older than fourteen or
sixteen are incompetent to waive their rights.187
Beyond the context of police interrogations, eight states always
require juveniles to meet with an attorney before waiving their right
to counsel during delinquency proceedings, and others “require
consultation under specific circumstances.”188 These safeguards
demonstrate states’ concern that juveniles are not “miniature
adults”189—they lack the cognitive and emotional capacity to un-
derstand and waive their rights.
4. Juveniles’ Relative Immaturity Renders Them Vulnerable to
Waiving the Right to Counsel in Response to Public Defender
Fees
Social science, state laws, juvenile justice jurisprudence, and the
high rate of waiver in many juvenile courts indicate that courts and
legislatures should be wary of the chilling effects of public defender
fees on children’s right to counsel.190 The particular effects of public
defender fees on children and their decision to waive counsel should
be considered when amending or striking down these schemes.
Indeed, public defender statutes typically place the onus of con-
tribution or reimbursement on parents, not court-involved youths
themselves.191 The Fuller Court held that recoupment statutes do
not chill adults’ right to counsel because the distant prospect of re-
payment does not unduly punish adult offenders for exercising their
185. Barry C. Feld, Juveniles’ Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights: An Empirical Study
of Policy and Practice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 26, 36 (2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. A Juvenile,
449 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Mass. 1983)).
186. Id. at 37.
187. Id.
188. NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., supra note 1, at 26.
189. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 274 (2011) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982)).
190. See supra Parts III.C.1-3.
191. See FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 9.
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right to counsel.192 Nevertheless, the In re Gault Court treated the
parent and child as a unit when considering an indigent child’s right
to counsel, reasoning that “the child and his parents must be
notified of the child’s right to ... counsel retained by them, or if they
are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to
represent the child.”193 In doing so, the Court recognized that
children’s financial status—and thus their access to counsel—is
linked to that of their family.194
Implicit in this acknowledgment is that a child and her parents
must discuss whether the child wants to waive counsel or whether
to apply for an indigency determination and have her family pay the
requisite contribution or recoupment costs.195 Thus, courts and
legislatures cannot isolate the effect of recoupment and contribution
statutes on a child’s parents even if public defender fee statutes
require parents alone to pay the cost of counsel.
In fact, as Part III.C.3 notes, certain states have explicitly
recognized this parent-child dynamic in their juvenile waiver laws.
Some states permit children to waive their right to counsel only
after consulting with a parent or an attorney.196 Other states
minimize or eliminate parental interference in the child-attorney
relationship: some prohibit waiver of counsel entirely or under
specific circumstances197 or require children to meet with an
attorney before waiving their right to counsel.198 These rules
demonstrate some states’ acknowledgment that financial strain or
other factors may prevent parents from acting in the best interest
of their children.
192. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 54 (1974); see also Andrea L. Martin, Note, Balancing
State Budgets at a Cost to Fairness in Delinquency Proceedings, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1638, 1670
(2004) (explaining how the Eighth Circuit upheld Minnesota's reimbursement statute as
applied to adults, and the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the state's recoupment statute
as applied to parents of juveniles because the delay of payment minimized coercion).
193. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1967) (emphasis added).
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-317(a)(3) (2020).
197. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.090(a) (2020) (prohibiting waiver without consultation
with an attorney when it has been alleged that the “minor has committed an act that would
be a felony if committed by an adult”).
198. See, e.g., FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.165(a).
1026 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:999
5. Juveniles’ Particular Characteristics Heighten the Need for
Legal Protections Against Waiver
Because juveniles are susceptible to parental influence, special
care should be taken to prevent them from waiving their right to
counsel due to public defender fees. As the Supreme Court did in
Fuller, courts should consider whether public defender fee schemes
chill the juvenile right to counsel.199
Admittedly, the exact scope of the juvenile right to counsel is not
entirely clear.200 In In re Gault, the Court based its decision to
extend the right to counsel to juveniles on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, not the Sixth Amendment.201 However, Justice Black asserted
in his concurrence that the majority decision actually extended the
Sixth Amendment right to juveniles through the Fourteenth
Amendment.202 In the Sixth Amendment context, the Court has
looked to whether public defender fees chill defendants’ right to
counsel.203 Therefore, if the scope of the juvenile right tracks with
the Sixth Amendment right in the adult system, then courts should
apply the chilling effects test. Given In re Gault’s broad, policy-
focused analysis,204 the more malleable chilling effects test may still
be applicable.
The analysis may be different if a court approaches public
defender fee schemes’ effects on juvenile waiver and potential
procedural safeguards from a Fourteenth Amendment perspective.
When deciding whether due process requires a particular procedural
safeguard in the civil context, the Court engages in a due process
balancing test under Mathews v. Eldridge.205 This Note considers
199. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 51-52 (1974).
200. Compare Mae C. Quinn, Giving Kids Their Due: Theorizing a Modern Fourteenth
Amendment Framework for Juvenile Defense Representation, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2185, 2191
(2014) (referring to the juvenile right to counsel as a pure Fourteenth Amendment right), with
Donna M. Bishop & Hillary B. Farber, Joining the Legal Significance of Adolescent
Developmental Capacities with the Legal Rights Provided by In re Gault, 60 RUTGERS L. REV.
125, 160-67 (2007) (discussing the juvenile counsel right as a Sixth Amendment right).
201. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
202. Id. at 64 (Black, J., concurring).
203. Fuller, 417 U.S. at 53-54.
204. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41.
205. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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both the chilling effects analysis and the more modern Mathews test
in turn.
a. Chilling Effects Analysis
The Court has not provided a bright-line rule or multifactor
standard for assessing when public defender fee statutes chill the
exercise of this right. Still, it has found laws that apply only to
defendants who are able to pay and those that provide criminal
debtors with the same protections as civil debtors do not chill the
right to counsel.206 United States v. Jackson delineated the contours
of the standard for determining when a statute impermissibly chills
a constitutional right:
If the provision had no other purpose or effect than to chill the
assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose
to exercise them, then it would be patently unconstitutional....
The question is not whether the chilling effect is “incidental”
rather than intentional; the question is whether that effect is
unnecessary and therefore excessive.207
In Jackson, the Court invalidated a provision of the Federal Kid-
napping Act that permitted only juries to impose the death penalty
in federal kidnapping cases.208 The Court reasoned that this pro-
vision placed “an impermissible burden upon the exercise of [the]
constitutional right” to jury trial by unduly pressuring defendants
to plead guilty to avoid the death penalty.209 The Court reasoned
that the problem with the selective death penalty provision was not
that it coerced individuals to plead guilty and waive their right to
trial, “but simply that it needlessly encourage[d] them.”210 The exis-
tence of alternate methods of ensuring that a jury decided the issue
of punishment was key to this analysis.211 For example, certain
states always required a jury to decide between life imprisonment
206. Fuller, 417 U.S. at 53-54; James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 138-42 (1972).
207. 390 U.S. 570, 581-82 (1968).
208. Id. at 571-72.
209. Id. at 572.
210. Id. at 583.
211. See id. at 582-83.
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or capital punishment, regardless of whether guilt was decided by
jury or plea.212
Courts have applied this chilling effect analysis to juvenile public
defender fee statutes.213 During the 1970s, two California state
courts considered the chilling effects of the state’s erstwhile
recoupment statute.214 In In re Ricky H., the California Supreme
Court declined to strike down California’s reimbursement statute on
the ground that it unconstitutionally chilled a juvenile’s right to
counsel.215 Instead, it held only that juvenile waivers of the right to
“counsel made to avoid or reduce parental pressure or displeasure”
were “neither intelligent nor voluntary” and thus invalid.216
In In re Elizabeth S., the California Court of Appeal considered
whether imposing a fifty-dollar fee for the cost of a public defender
on a juvenile as a condition for her release from custody chilled her
right to counsel.217 The court struck down this reimbursement
requirement, relying on state case law that had previously prohib-
ited imposing reimbursement costs as a condition of probation
because of this practice’s chilling effect on the right to counsel.218
Essentially, when a public defender fee resembled a sanction, the
California courts held that it chilled the right to counsel. When
these fees were implemented for purely economic purposes, they
were permitted.
New factual and legal developments over the past few decades
have undermined the California courts’ “economic purpose”
rationale. First, the Juvenile Law Center, a national juvenile justice
advocacy and research organization, has reported that the cost of
counsel, in fact, causes juveniles to waive their right to counsel.219
The Center surveyed stakeholders in the juvenile justice system,
such as attorneys, court-involved youth and their families, and
212. Id.
213. See In re Ricky H., 468 P.2d 204, 210 (Cal. 1970); In re Elizabeth S., 188 Cal. Rptr. 2,
4 (Ct. App. 1982). Scholars have also engaged in a chilling effects analysis. See Martin N.
Lettunich, Does Parental Liability for Legal Fees Infringe upon a Juvenile’s Constitutional
Rights, 10 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 347, 352-53 (1970); Martin, supra note 192, at 1660.
214. See In re Ricky H., 468 P.2d at 210; In re Elizabeth S., 188 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
215. In re Ricky H., 468 P.2d at 209-11.
216. Id. at 211.
217. See In re Elizabeth S., 188 Cal. Rptr. at 3-5.
218. Id. at 4-5.
219. FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 11.
2021] JUVENILE PUBLIC DEFENDER FEES 1029
judges, about the impact of public defender fees.220 Over one-third
of the stakeholders who reported that public defender fees nega-
tively impact juveniles and their families also reported that these
fees cause juveniles to waive their right to counsel.221 This finding
probably underestimates the scope of the problem, as attorneys are
unlikely to discover that a juvenile waived the right to counsel
specifically because of public defender fees.222 These observations
ultimately highlight that juvenile waiver resulting from public
defender fees is common and harmful, even if the fees’ purpose is
ostensibly economic.
Moreover, the California courts’ approach to the relationship
between juvenile public defender fees and waiver has been under-
mined by subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence in the Fifth
and Sixth Amendment contexts. The California courts held that
courts could invalidate a child’s waiver of the right to counsel if
the juvenile had waived in response to parental pressure.223
However, in Colorado v. Connelly, the Court held that “coercive gov-
ernment misconduct” must be present for a confession to be
involuntary and thus inadmissible in evidence.224 Consequently,
even “[t]he most outrageous behavior by a private party” would
not be unconstitutionally coercive under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and a confession produced by such
behavior would still be admissible.225 The Court reasoned that
without government coercion, there is no state action, which is
required for a Due Process violation.226 Two years later, in Patterson
v. Illinois, the Court clarified that a “more searching or formal
inquiry” must be made into the knowingness and voluntariness of
a defendant’s decision to waive the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel at trial as opposed to during post-indictment interroga-
tion.227 The Court reasoned that “the full ‘dangers and disadvan-
tages of self-representation’” are greater during trial than during
220. Id. at 15.
221. Id. at 11.
222. Id. at 19 n.58.
223. In re Ricky H., 468 P.2d 204, 211 (Cal. 1970).
224. 479 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1986).
225. Id. at 166.
226. Id. at 165.
227. 487 U.S. 285, 299 (1988).
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interrogation, which warrants a more thorough evaluation of the
waiver’s validity.228
The likely upshot of these two decisions is that although courts
must thoroughly investigate the circumstances surrounding a
juvenile’s waiver of the right to counsel during formal proceedings,
government coercion must have occurred for such a waiver to violate
the Due Process Clause.229 Indeed, courts could consider the creation
of a conflict of interest between juveniles and their parents govern-
ment coercion.230 It is more likely that courts would instead hold
that juvenile waivers of the right to counsel induced by parental
pressure are the result of merely private action.231
Thus, courts can conduct a “searching or formal inquiry” into the
effect of a juvenile’s age, educational background, and experience
with the juvenile justice system on waiver.232 However, courts can
assess these factors only to the extent that they render a juvenile
susceptible to direct coercion by government actors, such as the
police, but not by private parties, such as their parents and
guardians. Additionally, as a practical manner, courts in some areas
are reluctant to inquire into the circumstances of a waiver and are
quite willing to accept them.233 Unless they are required by court
rules or by law, juvenile courts may have little incentive to investi-
gate whether children are waiving their right to counsel because of
parental pressure resulting from defender fees.234 Simply put,
considering whether a juvenile’s waiver was knowing and intelligent
cannot cure the chilling effects of public defender fees.
Thus, under the Jackson chilling effect test, public defender fee
statutes penalize children for exercising their right to counsel by
228. Id. (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)).
229. See id.; Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165.
230. Martin, supra note 192, at 1664 n.205.
231. Id. at 1663-64 n.205 (“Connelly closes the door on constitutional claims of
involuntariness based on parental coercion.” (citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 170-71)).
232. Patterson, 487 U.S. at 299.
233. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text (discussing juvenile courts’ willingness
to accept juvenile waivers without inquiring into the circumstances of those waivers).
234. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165-66. Since the juvenile right to counsel is grounded in the
Fourteenth Amendment, children may not have the same right to self-representation that
adults possess under the Sixth Amendment. Berkheiser, supra note 19, at 639. Courts
therefore have greater flexibility to reject children’s waivers of their right to counsel. Still,
without any clarification from the Court, juvenile courts may continue to accept waivers
without adequately considering the circumstances of those waivers.
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conditioning their access to counsel on their families’ resources.235
This burden falls most heavily on children whose families are
indigent or those whose families are just above the threshold of
indigency.236 These children are already the most vulnerable to the
negative impacts of fees and fines within the juvenile system, such
as financial instability and prolonged probation.237
Furthermore, the penalties these fees place on the right to
counsel are unnecessary. In enacting public defender fee schemes,
states may have the legitimate goal of collecting revenue.238
Nevertheless, the lack of procedural safeguards exacerbates these
fees’ effects on waiver and indicates that alternative methods could
reduce the unnecessary chilling effect on juveniles’ right to
counsel.239
For example, states could ban or severely restrict juvenile waiver
or require that children meet with an attorney before waiving their
right to counsel.240 States that require children to consult with an
attorney before waiving their right to counsel often have lower rates
of juvenile waiver than those that do not.241 These discrepancies in
waiver rates suggest that without appropriate safeguards, public
defender fee laws needlessly encourage children to forgo their right
to counsel. In light of these effects, states should also end the
practice of collecting these fees entirely.242
235. Lettunich, supra note 213, at 354.
236. See Tamar R. Birckhead, Delinquent by Reason of Poverty, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
53, 85-87 (2012).
237. FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 101, at 6-8.
238. See Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, The Political Economy of Application Fees
for Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2045, 2046-47 (2006).
239. See NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., supra note 1, at 25-29.
240. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
241. NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., supra note 1, at 27. For example, before the creation of Florida
Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.165(a), which requires juveniles to meet with counsel before
deciding to waive counsel, juveniles were required only to meet with a parent before waiving
this right. See FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.165(a); PATRICIA PURITZ & CATHRYN CRAWFORD, FLORIDA: AN
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL & QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS 20,105n.85 (2006), https://njdc.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Florida-Assess
ment1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TWD-J2X6]. The National Juvenile Defender Center found that
this prior rule was “routinely flouted” and was an inadequate safeguard against waiver. Id.
at 2.
242. See infra Part IV.B.
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The fact that these laws indirectly affect juvenile waivers through
children’s parents is immaterial to this analysis.243 As the Court
noted in Jackson, the determination of whether a law penalizes the
exercise of a constitutional right hinges on the law’s “unnecessary
and ... excessive” effects.244 Therefore, because public defender fees
likely cause unnecessary and excessive waivers, they violate the
right to counsel.
b. Mathews Analysis
Alternatively, if the juvenile right to counsel is considered a
purely due process right, courts may use a due process balancing
test to consider whether public defender fee schemes are fundamen-
tally fair under the Fourteenth Amendment.245 If courts encounter
a challenge to juvenile public defender fee laws, they may consider
additional procedural safeguards to prevent unnecessary waivers
under the Mathews test rather than the chilling effects test.
Mathews provides a balancing test to determine what procedural
protections due process requires.246 Under Mathews, courts consider
(1) the private interest at stake, (2) “the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest ... and probable value ... of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards,” and (3) “the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and adminis-
trative burdens” that would result from implementation of the
proposed procedural safeguard.247 The outcome of the analysis would
therefore depend upon the specific procedural safeguard being
proposed.248
First, the private interest at stake would be juveniles’ interest in
their physical liberty. Ample research has shown that children
243. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968).
244. Id.
245. Quinn, supra note 200, at 2188 (discussing how the Court appeared to decide In re
Gault on fundamental fairness grounds).
246. Jennifer K. Pokempner, Riya Saha Shah, Mark F. Houldin, Michael J. Dale & Robert
G. Schwartz, Legal Significance of Adolescent Development on the Right to Counsel:
Establishing the Constitutional Right to Counsel for Teens in Child Welfare Matters and
Assuring a Meaningful Right to Counsel in Delinquency Matters, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
529, 541 (2012).
247. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
248. See id.
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waive their right to counsel because of their and their families’
inability to pay for public defender fees.249 Access to counsel
significantly improves children’s ability to avoid detention, negotiate
fairer probation conditions, and assert their rights.250 Some
empirical research demonstrates that juveniles who are represented
by counsel may actually receive harsher treatment from juvenile
court judges.251 This may result from “[j]uvenile court judges’
resistance to and even resentment of, defense lawyers.”252 Never-
theless, improved or universal access to counsel would mitigate this
result: “if all children receive representation by counsel, judges will
[not] be able to penalize ... everyone.”253
Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of children’s liberty
without additional procedural protections for the right to counsel is
high, as discussed above.254 One Missouri judge summarized the
problem succinctly: when asked whether children understood what
waiving the right to counsel meant, he responded, “[N]o, they
don’t.... [K]ids are trying to avoid additional expenses for their par-
ents.”255 Improvements to the process of appointment counsel, such
as presuming indigence, and modifications to juvenile waiver, such
as requiring juveniles to meet with an attorney before waiving
counsel or banning waiver outright, would each reduce or eliminate
the possibility that juveniles would waive counsel in response to
public defender fees.256
Third, courts would need to consider the government interests in
cost minimization and administrative efficiency when determining
whether to implement any additional safeguards.257 Safeguards that
increase children’s access to counsel would come with financial and
249. Scali, supra note 7, at 12-13.
250. Pokempner et al., supra note 246, at 564-65.
251. Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing the American Juvenile Court, in 17 CRIME AND JUSTICE:
A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 197, 225-27 (Michael Tonry ed., 1993).
252. Berkheiser, supra note 19, at 642.
253. Id.
254. See supra Part I.C. (discussing findings demonstrating a high rate of waiver among
juveniles).
255. NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR, MISSOURI: JUSTICE RATIONED: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO
COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF JUVENILE DEFENSE REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS 39 (2013), https://njdc.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Missouri-Assessment.
pdf [https://perma.cc/B3JU-B24Z].
256. See infra Part IV.A.
257. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
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administrative burdens. Nonetheless, “[f]inancial cost alone is not
a controlling weight in determining whether due process requires a
particular procedural safeguard prior to some administrative
decision.”258 Moreover, by ensuring that youth receive access to
counsel early, these safeguards would likely allow the juvenile
justice system to function more efficiently and cost-effectively, as
explained below.259 Part IV discusses the feasibility of these
proposals but ultimately advocates for ending the practice of
imposing juvenile public defender fees.
IV. SOLUTIONS: CURBING AND ELIMINATING THE CHILLING EFFECT
In order to prevent public defender fees from chilling juveniles’
right to counsel, states could take two paths. First, they could
improve the waiver process itself to insulate children from the
pressures of their family’s financial circumstances. Second, they
could eliminate the use of public defender fees entirely. Part IV
addresses both of these solutions and counterarguments against
them in turn.
A. Reducing Parental Influence on the Juvenile Right to Counsel
One method to reduce the likelihood that children will waive their
right to counsel due to public defender fees would be to constrain
the influence that parents have on their children’s decisions
regarding counsel. This Part lays out various suggestions of how to
insulate children from their family’s financial circumstances so that
they do not or cannot waive their right to counsel.
1. Methods of Minimizing Parental Influence
States could minimize parental involvement in the relationship
between juveniles and their counsel in several ways. First, they
could require juveniles to meet with an attorney before they decide
whether to waive counsel.260 Notably, states that require children to
258. Id.
259. See infra Part IV.A.
260. See NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., supra note 1, at 27.
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consult with an attorney before waiving counsel have the lowest
rates of waiver.261 States could also presume that children are
indigent for the purpose of appointing counsel so that counsel is
automatically appointed.262 Alternatively, states could ban waiver
outright.263 All of these safeguards have the added benefit of
ensuring juveniles’ access to counsel early in the delinquency
process, which allows children to be better informed about their
rights and options.264
If a state chooses to require pre-waiver meetings, it should not
allow parents to substitute for attorneys in these meetings.265 For
example, New Hampshire requires children to meet with a nonhos-
tile parent (but not counsel) before waiving their right to a lawyer.266
Such a solution still leaves open the possibility that parents could
pressure their children into refusing an attorney.267 Consequently,
this solution would not sufficiently eliminate public defender fees’
chilling effect on the right to counsel.
2. Addressing Counterarguments to These Solutions
A lack of resources and personnel may pose logistical obstacles if
a state requires meetings between children and their counsel, au-
tomatically appoints counsel, bans waiver, or implements a com-
bination of these solutions.268 States may not possess the financial
resources and personnel to facilitate more meetings early in the
delinquency process or provide counsel for every child.269 Nonethe-
less, stakeholders in the juvenile justice system have recognized
that these kinds of reforms are not only much needed but also cost-
effective.
In particular, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges (NCJFCJ) recommended that appointing counsel early in the
261. See id.
262. See id. at 10.
263. See id. at 27.
264. See generally King et al., supra note 111.
265. See NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., supra note 1, at 27-28.
266. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:12(II)(a)-(b) (2020).
267. PURITZ & CRAWFORD, supra note 241, at 2.
268. See SCALI ET AL., supra note 54, at 25 (discussing how “lack of resources and time”
delayed initial interviews with clients).
269. See id.
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juvenile process and having children meet with their attorney in
advance of their initial hearing would help the juvenile system
operate more efficiently.270 The NCJFCJ reasoned “that providing
counsel facilitates earlier resolution of cases,” thereby saving money
and time.271
Presuming children to be indigent ensures that children are
quickly appointed counsel.272 Further, requiring children to meet
with their attorneys to discuss their waiver decision decreases the
rate of waiver and ensures more children are represented.273 Such
early, unimpeded access to counsel would have tangible positive
benefits. When children are represented by counsel, their cases are
resolved faster.274 As the NCJFCJ reports, early access to counsel
would allow courts to avoid having “to continue a case for arraign-
ment or first appearance of counsel.”275 Juveniles will instead be
more likely to resolve their case at the initial hearing.276 In fact, a
study from a juvenile court in Ohio found that when children had
access to counsel at their initial hearing, “78% of cases were
resolved at that hearing.”277 Ultimately, the NCJFCJ guidelines
suggest that requiring early consultation between children and
attorneys and presuming indigence would not only curb the chilling
effect of public defender fees on the right to counsel but also would
save courts and defenders substantial resources.278
Additionally, entirely banning juvenile waiver would likely not
pose substantial legal or logistical problems.279 First, like presuming
270. NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV.&FAM.CT.JUDGES,ENHANCED JUVENILE JUSTICE GUIDELINES
ch. III at 23-25 (2018), https://www.ncjfcj.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/NCJFCJ_Enhanc
ed_Juvenile_Justice_Guidelines_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/WH4Y-PXPH].
271. Id. at 24.
272. King et al., supra note 111, at 17.
273. See NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., supra note 1, at 27.
274. NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, supra note 270, ch. III, at 25.
275. Id. ch. XII, at 25.
276. See id.
277. Id. ch. III, at 33 n.28 (citing JUV. DIV. OF THE LUCAS CNTY. CT. OF COMMON PLEAS,
2001 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2001)). The NCJFCJ also suggests other methods that courts could
use to save resources and free up public defenders’ time, such as using court information
management systems to organize docket time more efficiently and consolidating petitions to
decrease the number of hearings that courts must hold. Id. ch. XII, at 24.
278. See id. at 23-25.
279. See NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., supra note 1, at 27 (noting that three states already ban
waiver in most circumstances). Banning waiver of counsel would obviate the need for
juveniles and attorneys to meet specifically to discuss juveniles’ waiver decisions. Even so,
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indigence and requiring meetings between juveniles and counsel,
this approach ensures that all children are represented and fa-
cilitates the efficient operation of juvenile justice.280 Moreover,
judges across the country routinely refuse to accept juvenile waivers
of counsel as a matter of practice or state law, indicating that for-
malizing such a ban would not overburden juvenile courts and
defenders.281
Second, juveniles may not possess the right to self-representation
like adults do under Faretta v. California.282 Faretta held that adults
have the right to self-representation in state proceedings and may
waive counsel even when they have been advised against it.283 The
Court decided this case “based on the express language of the Sixth
Amendment.”284 In contrast, the juvenile right to counsel appears to
be grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.285 While the exact scope of the juvenile right to counsel
remains unsettled, Faretta’s holding may not extend to minors.286 It
is unlikely that minors possess the right to self-representation.
B. Ending the Practice of Imposing Juvenile Defender Fees 
Of course, the best method of reducing the chilling effect of ju-
venile public defender fees would be to eliminate them entirely.287
This method serves the juvenile justice system’s rehabilitative goals
by uncoupling juveniles’ access to counsel from their parents’
requiring meetings between juveniles and their attorneys prior to the first court appearance
would still best protect juveniles’ rights by allowing them to adequately prepare for this
hearing. See supra notes 272-78 and accompanying text. This consequence would also help the
juvenile justice system run more efficiently. See supra notes 269-79 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 268-78 and accompanying text.
281. See, e.g., GABRIELLA CELESTE &PATRICIA PURITZ,NAT’L JUV.DEF.CTR.,THE CHILDREN
LEFT BEHIND 62 (2001), https://njdc.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Final-Louisana-Assess
ment-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CU5Z-D5CV].
282. See 422 U.S. 806, 834, 836 (1975); see also Martin, supra note 192, at 1667.
283. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 818.
284. Berkheiser, supra note 19, at 639.
285. Id.
286. See id.
287. California ended the practice of collecting juvenile public defender fees in 2018. See
S.B. 190, 2017-2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). Such a solution would also prevent absurd results
should a state enact a bar on juvenile waiver. Prohibiting waiver of counsel but also requiring
the payment of public defender fees would put families who could not afford these fees in the
difficult position of being forced to pay them.
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financial resources.288 In doing so, this solution allows juveniles to
consult with counsel and learn about rehabilitative court diversion
programs early in the adjudicatory process.289
The main difficulty with enacting such a law would be making up
for lost revenue. Public defender agencies are notoriously under-
funded and may oppose repealing public defender fees.290 In fact,
these agencies themselves have supported public defender fees as
a politically acceptable method of financing their work.291 Further,
the solution could also pose a legal quandary. At common law,
parents were required to pay for their children’s necessaries, in-
cluding the cost of counsel.292 This doctrine lends legal support to
these laws because it suggests that parents should be responsible
for funding their children’s representation.293 In response to these
arguments, some have proposed that states could remove any up-
front contribution costs but permit recoupment, which could atten-
uate any effects on the right to counsel.294
However, the legal and cost-related arguments against ending
public defender fees are outweighed by the risk these laws pose to
the juvenile right to counsel. First, ending contribution but main-
taining recoupment would be an inadequate solution: recoupment
poses an equal threat to the right to counsel because it raises the
possibility of long-standing debts.295 In a Juvenile Law Center
survey, 42.3 percent of the juvenile justice system stakeholders who
reported that public defender fees negatively impact youths also
reported that nonpayment of fees “resulted in a civil judgment ...
that carried into adulthood.”296 Further, recoupment schemes in the
juvenile system do not provide parents or children with adequate
due process protections.297 This lack of procedural safeguards
288. See supra Part I.A.
289. King et al., supra note 111, at 16.
290. NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., DEFEND CHILDREN 30 (2016), https://njdc.info/wp-content/up
loads/2016/11/Defend-Children-A-Blueprint-for-Effective-Juvenile-Defender-Services.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N44Z-RUS2].
291. Wright & Logan, supra note 238, at 2047.
292. Martin, supra note 192, at 1657-58.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1669-70.
295. See Wright & Logan, supra note 238, at 2065.
296. FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 11.
297. See supra Part III.B.
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threatens children and families with debts that they may not be
able to contest or repay, engendering an immediate and direct
chilling effect.298 Moreover, children are shortsighted and deferential
to authority figures, such as their parents.299 Even if recoupment’s
effects are more attenuated than contribution’s, children may be
more sensitive to the possibility of repayment than adults.300 They
may be more likely than adult offenders to waive their rights in
response to their own fears of going into debt or pressure from their
family’s financial difficulties.301
Second, ending public defender fees is in fact cost-effective
because it ensures early access to counsel and cuts down collection
costs.302 As Part IV.A.2 argues, facilitating the early appointment of
counsel actually saves resources because counsel are able to assist
juveniles in resolving their cases more quickly. Ending recoupment
would also save the administrative costs of monitoring the financial
resources of juveniles and their families to determine if they have
become able to pay for the cost of counsel.303 In fact, research
suggests that counties earn little revenue from collecting juvenile
administrative fees, such as public defender fees.304 Further, the
revenue that is collected is spent on collection activity, not support
for court-involved youth.305 As a Massachusetts juvenile court judge
stated, “There’s a better way to do business [than imposing fees].”306
Eliminating juvenile public defender fees would enable the juvenile
justice system to run more smoothly, ensure judicial resources are
spent efficiently, and most importantly, safeguard children’s rights.
298. See supra Part III.B.
299. See supra Part III.C.2.
300. See supra Part III.C.4.
301. See supra Part III.C.2.
302. See supra Part IV.A.2.
303. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text (discussing the methods states use to
determine if a child or her family have adequate financial resources to pay for counsel).
304. BERKELEY L. UNIV. OF CAL. POL’Y ADVOC. CLINIC, MAKING FAMILIES PAY 17-19 (2017).
305. Id.
306. Teresa Wiltz, Movement Against Juvenile Court Fees Runs into Resistance, PEW (Jan.
17, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/01/17/
movement-against-juvenile-court-fees-runs-into-resistance [https://perma.cc/94XN-3A37].
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CONCLUSION
The practice of collecting juvenile public defender fees through
contribution and recoupment threatens the juvenile right to counsel.
These laws undermine the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile
justice system by delaying youth’s access to counsel or depriving
them of that right entirely, heightening the risk that they will be
adjudicated delinquent and face serious collateral consequences.
Jurisprudence on the unique position of juveniles within the justice
system suggests that even when the burden of paying public
defender fees falls on parents, juveniles’ right to counsel will still be
chilled. Under pressure from their parents and lacking adequate
legal safeguards, juveniles may waive their right to counsel and face
the juvenile system without effective guidance.
To prevent these outcomes, states could work to remove the ef-
fect of parents on the child-counsel dynamic, such as by presum-
ing children to be indigent, banning waiver, and mandating that
children consult with counsel before waiving their right to an at-
torney. These safeguards would help the juvenile justice system run
more efficiently and better protect children’s rights. Nonetheless,
banning the collection of juvenile defender fees entirely would be the
most apt solution. It would provide the strongest protection of
juveniles’ right to counsel and promote the central tenets of In re
Gault. This safeguard would facilitate early access to counsel,
allowing juvenile cases to be resolved sooner, and would save state
and local governments the expense of collecting fees, which has been
shown to cost more than the revenue that these fees bring in. Public
defender fees are simply not worth the cost to children and families.
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